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A NEW HOPE FOR THE REPUBLIC
ABSTRACT
This study illustrates the ideological origins of fair 
trade in the Virginia Port Bill of 1784. Drafted by James 
Madison when he was a member of the commerce committee in the 
Virginia House of Delegates, the Port Bill restricted the 
trade between Virginia's planters and foreign merchants to 
five enumerated ports. British merchants enjoyed a monopoly 
in the tobacco trade before the war, and their unlimited 
access to the Chesapeake market caused many Virginia planters 
to fall deeply into debt. After the war, when the British 
merchants returned to the Chesapeake, Madison wished to 
prevent further indebtedness by forcing foreign merchants to 
compete against each other for contracts with planters in 
legally designated ports.
The Port Bill was not implemented until 1787, and after 
the ratification of the Federal Constitution in 1788, the law 
was rendered unconstitutional. While the bill achieved only 
limited legislative success, the debate over the Port Bill in 
1784-1787 provided the earliest definitions of free trade in 
the American political tradition. The prohibition of 
mercantile activity in places where trade once flourished 
could easily be seen as a protectionist policy. However, 
Madison won support for the bill on the grounds that it 
promoted free trade. Madison believed the Port Bill provided 
the necessary legislative action to forcibly create an open 
port and a free market by insuring competition through equal 
access. His definition of "free trade" thus outlined a 
principle that is better understood as "fair trade."
The recognition of fair, rather than free, trade as a 
fundamental tenet in the emerging ideology of classical 
liberalism establishes an important principle within American 
political thought. The realization that American policymakers 
advocated fair trade in espousing the dogma of "free trade" 
explains how in the golden age of classical liberalism, the 
United States maintained protectionist trade policies and high 
tariff walls. How the Virginia delegates expressed their 
support for the Port Bill of 1784 thus reveals important 
insights into the actual meaning and subsequent development 
of "free trade" in American history.
RICHARD SMITH CHEW III 
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY 
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY
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A NEW HOPE FOR THE REPUBLIC
CHAPTER ONE
A NEW HOPE FOR THE REPUBLIC
James Madison was disappointed. While John Adams contributed 
significantly to the revolutionary cause during the war, the 
publication of his Defence of the Constitutions of Government of 
the United States of America confirmed Madison's suspicions about 
Adams's political beliefs. Complaining about the frequent comments 
"unfriendly to republicanism" throughout the Defence, Madison 
accused Adams of writing a "mock defence" of the "Republican 
Constitutions of his Country" and then attacking them with a 
shameless display of rhetoric and sophistry.1 Others maligned the 
Defence as "one of the most deep wrought systems of political 
deception that ever was penned by the ingenuity of man," and James 
McClurg jested that Adams's "optics have been too weak to withstand 
the glass of European courts."2 Aware of the heated criticism 
provoked by his work, Adams turned to Benjamin Franklin in 1787, 
explaining that the Defence "contains my confession of political
\James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (June 6, 1787), The Papers 
of Thomas Jefferson, edited by Julian Boyd, (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1950-), XI, p. 402
2James McClurg to James Madison, (August 22, 1787), and the 
Richmond Virginia Independent Chronicle. (August 15, 1787), both
quoted in Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution. (Boston, 
Little, Brown and Co., Cambridge, 1947), p. 816-818.
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3faith, and, if it is heresy, I shall, I suppose, be cast out of 
communion. But it is the only sense in which I am or ever was a 
Republican.113
The confusion and disagreement among eighteenth-century 
intellectuals concerning the definition of "republican" has focused 
the attention of many political historians on the post-revolution 
period. While most historians of the Revolution accept that 
"republicanism" provided a defining ideology for the rebellion in 
the 1770s, a consensus does not exist over whether or not 
republicanism continued to dominate political thought during the 
early national period.4 Those who contend that republicanism did 
not survive the constitutional convention of 1787 insist that a 
nineteenth-century version of liberalism was ascendant during the 
1790s. The debate over the legacy of the Revolution thus turns on
3John Adams to Benjamin Franklin, (January 27, 1787),
The Works of Beniamin Franklin, edited by John Bigelow, (New York, 
1904), XI, p. 298-299.
4For those who argue that republicanism continued to dominate 
political life in the early national period, see Lance Banning, The 
Jeffersonian Persuasion: The Evolution of a Party Ideology.
(Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1978), Forrest MacDonald, The 
Presidency of Thomas Jefferson. (University of Kansas Press, 
Lawrence, 1976), and Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic; Political 
Economy in Jeffersonian America. (University of North Carolina 
Press, Chapel Hill, 1980). For those who argue that liberalism 
superseded republicanism soon after the ratification of the Federal 
Constitution, see Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: 
The Republican Vision of the 1790s. (New York University Press, 
New York, 1984) and Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical 
Imagination. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1992), John 
Patrick Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue. Self-
Interest. and the Foundations of Liberalism. (New York, 1985), and 
Isaac Kramnick, "Republican Revisionism Revisited," American 
Historical Review. LXXXVII (1982), p. 629-664.
4the question of the political configuration of the 1790s, and the 
ideological origins of the American liberal tradition. To build 
a consensus, we must retrace the origins of the core beliefs of 
classical liberalism.
Central to the classical liberalism of the nineteenth-century 
was a belief in "free trade," and the earliest legislative battle 
over this doctrine in America was the Virginia Port Bill of 1784. 
While the question of free trade and the direction of United States 
trade policies during the nineteenth-century were not ultimately 
decided by the Virginia legislature during the 1780s, the debate 
over the port bill did provide the earliest definitions of free 
trade during the formative years of American liberalism. How the 
Virginia delegates expressed their support for this doctrine in the 
1780s reveals important insights into the actual meaning and 
subsequent development of that doctrine in American history.
The delegates assembled in Richmond in May 1784 enjoyed the 
early hints of summer, as the smell of cherries and strawberries 
renewed the spirit of the marketplace. Hickories budded on the 
distant mountains while peach trees blossomed throughout the 
commonwealth.5 A year had passed since the conclusion of the 
American Revolution. No longer threatened by the destructive force
Meteorological Journal for Orange County, Virginia, The Papers 
of James Madison, edited by William Hutchinson and William Rachal, 
(Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962-), VIII, p. 519. Madison 
began keeping the journal at the urging of Jefferson, who wrote to 
him on March 16, 1784, "I wish you would keep a diary under the
following...(meteorological charts)...It will be an amusement to 
you and may become useful." (Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of 
James Madison. VIII, p. 16).
5of the British armies, many Virginians reflected on the state of 
the commonwealth. The end of the long and bitter struggle with 
Great Britain realized the hopes and fears of a revolutionary 
generation, and the Old Dominion could claim a significant share 
of the credit for victory. "Virginia furnished the country's most 
eloquent spokesmen for freedom and equality," a Virginian drafted 
the Declaration of Independence and another "commanded the 
Continental Army that won independence" for the colonies. 
Virginia's tobacco "helped to buy American independence."6 However, 
independence remained a hollow reality and an unfulfilled dream for 
those in the marketplace.
During the war, Virginians believed political independence 
assured economic independence and control of the commonwealth's 
commercial destiny. With the cloak of mercantilism lifted from the 
Chesapeake after the war, planters expected merchants from all of 
Europe and America to bid up the price of tobacco in the spirit of 
free competition. The British monopoly on importing consumer goods 
would thus end, and competition in an open market would determine 
prices on foreign manufactures. Wartime austerity would yield to 
commercial prosperity and the promise of a republican society.7 
Mark Lynch, a merchant in Nantes with connections to Philip Mazzei, 
the Virginia agent in Tuscany during the war, assured James Madison
6Edmund Morgan, American Slavery. American Freedom: The Ordeal
of Colonial Virginia. (WW Norton, New York, 1975), p. 6
7Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in
Jeffersonian America. (WW Norton, New York, 1982), p. 76-77.
6that "every article necessary in America, can be procured and 
shipped here [America] on reasonable terms, which I dare say you 
will experience hereafter."8
The problems of post-war readjustment in Virginia dampened the 
confidence of its leaders in achieving economic independence from 
the British. The free trade the planters envisioned did not 
materialize. The Farmers General refused to purchase tobacco 
directly from Virginians after the close of hostilities, preferring 
the more familiar business of British mercantile houses.9 Orders 
in Council of December 1783 stipulated that American tobacco 
destined for reexport be admitted and warehoused duty-free in Great 
Britain.10 The continuance of the traditional British monopoly on 
the importation of American tobacco into France thus foiled the 
plans of Chesapeake planters to introduce direct American trade to 
Europe's largest market. The slumping export market, combined with 
a flood of British imports to meet pent up American demand, 
resulted in depression and economic uncertainty.
This interpretation of Virginia's post-war depression was not 
accepted by everyone. The Chevalier de la Luzerne, a French
8Mark Lynch to James Madison, (February 15, 1783), Hutchinson 
and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VI, p. 243. Philip Mazzei 
was the commercial agent and wartime financier for Virginia in 
Tuscany, 1778-1782.
9David Ross and other Virginia merchants to Thomas Jefferson,
(October 18, 1785), Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VIII, 
p. 650-651.
10Lewis Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United
States to 1860. (The Carnegie Institute, Washington, 1933),
II, p. 600.
7minister to America, rejected claims that British merchants and the 
Farmers General were to blame for the deteriorating situation, and 
insisted upon an alternative explanation when he wrote to Congress 
in September 1783. He explained that the "Americans by admitting 
too precipitately English vessels in their ports have deprived 
themselves of a powerful weapon to induce England to a conclusion 
of the Treaty [of commerce]11 on free trade terms.11 Thus, the 
Americans authored their own commercial crisis. Allowing 
mercantile traffic to proceed before diplomats determined the 
proper terms of that trade compromised the commercial standing of 
the United States in Europe.12 The accusation struck a familiar 
chord with many Virginians.
American diplomats had begun discussions over a treaty of 
commerce with Britain in 1783, and in May, the "project...[had] 
been reported by the Secretary [of] foreign affairs" and was placed 
"in the hands of a committee." The objectives of the American
“Chevalier de la Luzerne to Congress, (September 18, 1783), 
Journals of the Continental Congress. 1774-1789. edited by Chauncey 
Ford, (Washington, 1904-1937), XXV, p. 589.
“This was especially true in light of the collapse of the Earl 
of Shelburne's government on February 24, 1783. A week earlier, 
on February 17, 1783, Shelburne delivered before parliament that 
"situated as we are between the old world and the new, and between 
the southern and northern Europe, all that we ought to covet upon 
the earth is free trade, and fair equality. With more industry, 
with more enterprise, with more capital than ant other trading 
nation upon earth, it ought to be our constant cry, let every 
market be open, let us meet our rivals fairly, and we ask no more." 
fCobbett's Parliamentary History of England: From the Norman
Conquest in 1066 to the Year 1803. (T.C. Hansard, 1806-1820, 36
volumes), XXIII, cols. 409-410. The new administration did not 
share Shelburne's enthusiasm and respect for open ports and 
markets.
8envoys included a direct trade between the United States and the 
West Indies, and "a right of carrying from [the] West Indies to all 
other parts of the world."13 The American ministers clearly 
intended to secure a liberal and free trade with the entire British 
Empire. However, the diplomats failed to reach an agreement before 
Thomas Jefferson met with the British minister Mr. Hartley in 
December 1783. At this meeting, the delegates to the treaty 
discussions received word that "a vessel arrived in France from 
Philadelphia bringing intelligence that all our ports were thrown 
open to British vessels." Soon after, "Mr. Hartley, who wished to 
establish a liberal system of commerce with us, then went to London 
hoping to return shortly and renew the commercial discussions." 
The American ministers predicted even then that it was "doubtful 
whether he (would) return at all."14 More than a decade passed 
before Mr. Hartley's vision for the Atlantic trade would be 
realized.
With merchants from Glasgow to Bristol crowding into colonial 
harbors, the Chevalier de la Luzerne's observations appeared
“James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (May 13, 1783), Hutchinson
and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 39
“Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Harrison, (December 17, 1783),
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI, p. 388-389
9difficult to deny.15 Edmund Randolph observed that "several British 
vessels have arrived in our rivers: some of which affect to
entitle themselves to an entry by distress, and others in right of 
commerce upon the cessation of hostilities."16 Edmund Pendleton 
echoed this remark that "our trade is almost at a stand, many 
Vessels lying in the Rivers, not yet permitted to trade."17 James 
Madison even received a letter from a loyalist merchant residing 
in London inquiring as to the commercial situation in Virginia 
following the war. "Give me as particular Account as you can of 
the Regulations," asked Joseph Chew, "I earnestly wish to know the 
situation of the Trade in Virginia and the demand for British 
Goods.1,18 By the end of May 1783, Virginia's ports were fully open 
to British ships, and Randolph deplored "the general ardor after 
those commodities which public acts have so lately proscribed."
Benjamin Harrison expressed similar concerns to the delegates 
in Philadelphia in November 1783, wishing that "Congress had 
entered into some general recommendations for counteracting the
15Some exiled native loyalists returned to Virginia prior to 
the arrival of the British merchants. The local patriots in 
Norfolk did not greet them warmly, though their presence was not 
treated as a British scheme to subvert the economy of Virginia. 
See Tom Costa, Economic Development and Political Authority: 
Norfolk. Virginia. Merchant-Maaistrates. 1736-1800, (unpubl. PhD. 
Diss., The College of William and Mary, 1991), p. 280-290
16Edmund Randolph to James Madison, (May 9, 1783),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 33.
17Edmund Pendleton to James Madison, (May 10, 1783), 
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 37.
18Joseph Chew to James Madison, (November 6, 1783),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 399.
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British regulations on trade." He speculated that "perhaps it 
would not be amiss to prohibit the importation of their 
manufactures altogether 'till they open their ports to us."19 
Randolph and the Chevalier agreed that Americans squandered their 
national reputation "in the opinion of those people, who beyond the 
water have admired our self-denial, by a hunger and thirst after 
cheese and porter."20
The failure to secure a commercial treaty with Great Britain 
contributed to the post-war depression in the colonies. In the 
midst of economic dislocation, the return of the British merchants 
reminded Virginians of the dominance that Glasgow merchants 
achieved in the tobacco trade before the war. Glasgow achieved its 
commanding position in the Chesapeake after the British Tobacco Act 
of 1751 established "a rigid system of controls governing the 
internal movement of tobacco" in Great Britain. This act placed 
duties and imposed restrictions on the importation, warehousing, 
and sale of American-grown tobacco in Great Britain.21 To insure 
customers before the Revolution, the Scots provided planters with 
nearly unlimited credit. During the 1750s, the large Glasgow 
merchant houses, which benefitted from economies of scale, began
19Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia delegates in Congress, 
(November 14, 1783), Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI, 
p. 354.
20Edmund Randolph to James Madison, (May 24, 1783),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 73.
21 Jacob Price, "The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco 
Trade, 1707-1775," The William and Marv Quarterly. 3d series, XXI 
(1954), p. 179-199.
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to dominate the Chesapeake trade. By the end of the decade lesser 
British ports could no longer compete, and only London remained as 
an alternative to the Firth of Clyde.22 The French maintained 
agents in Glasgow and London, and some "Glaswegians made their 
purchases in America with the French market only in mind."23 The 
expanding number of Scots merchants during the 1760s rendered 
Chesapeake tobacco a speculative enterprise for the Glasgow 
merchants, and the liberal use of credit encouraged indebtedness 
and compromised the economic independence of the planters.
This situation exacerbated a chronic problem for Virginia 
commerce. The highly decentralized river system provided a large 
number of ports of entry for the trade in tobacco. There were 
almost as many harbors as plantations, and since the seventeenth 
century, transactions between foreign merchants and planters 
occurred almost on the landings of the plantations. In the 
seventeenth century, "every planter owned a wharf; indeed the 
strongest reason after fertility of the soil which influenced him 
in selecting a tract of land was that it fronted on the water
22Jacob Price argues that the institutional structure of the 
French tobacco market encouraged the extension of credit in 
Virginia. Thus, the demands of the French market may have 
encouraged Parliament to pass the Tobacco Act of 1751 to facilitate 
the creation of a debt cycle. See Jacob Price, "The Economic 
Growth of the Chesapeake and the European Market, 1697-1775," 
Journal of Economic History. XXIV, (1964), p. 496-511
“Price, "The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade, 
1707-1775," The William and Mary Quarterly. 3d Series, XXI (1954), 
p. 191.
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highway."24 The combination of extensive credit and the 
decentralized river system isolated the planter from the 
marketplace where merchants would have had to bid up the price of 
tobacco to win contracts. British dominance suppressed
competition, promoting indebtedness and economic dependency for 
planters.25 The lack of a commercial center disadvantaged planters 
who "got in debt to the Merchants who set their own prices," and 
the return of these merchants threatened to renew the debt cycle 
in Virginia.26 The commercial disadvantages that resulted from 
merchant monopolies angered George Mason. He spared no sympathy 
against the merchants in a formal protest of the attempt to repeal 
legislation barring extensive credits. Mason claimed those "who 
promoted the said Petition [to repeal]" did so "in Order to dispose 
of their goods at exorbitant Prices," and to continue selling goods
24Philip Alexander Bruce, Economic History of Virginia in the 
Seventeenth-Century. (MacMillan & Co., New York, 1896), II, esp. 
p. 524-561. Also see Albert Giesecke, American Commercial
Legislation Before 1789. (Burt Franklin, New York, 1910), p. 102.
25While Virginia/s debt did sore from one million pounds
sterling to over two million between 1757 and 1775 as a result of 
the Scots factors, tobacco process actually rose from 1750-1775, 
and "income from tobacco per laborer rose more than twice as 
rapidly after 1750 as before that year." See Allan Kulikoff, 
Tobacco and Slaves: The Development of Southern Cultures in the
Chesapeake. 1680-1800. (Univ. of North Carolina Press for the 
Institute of Early American History and Culture, Chapel Hill, 
1986), esp. p. 119-127.
26James Madison to James Monroe, (June 4, 1786),
The Papers of James Madison. IX, p. 74
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"upon long Credit, on open Accounts."27
The lack of a commercial treaty with Great Britain closed the 
Americans out of both, the French and the British mercantile 
systems, and ruined the possibility of free trade between America 
and Europe. While some blamed the return of the British merchants 
for the depression, and others criticized the inaction of the 
American Congress, or the impatience of the American consumer, all 
could agree on the commercial consequences for Virginia. The 
renewal of British dominance and the flood of imports to meet pent 
up demand threatened to undermine the economic independence of the 
newly liberated colonies. In July 1784, matters worsened when 
Spain closed the Mississippi to American navigation and asserted 
territorial claims over a considerable area between the river and 
Georgia. The result was foreign influence and exploitation in the 
West and a disorganized and disunited commercial predicament in 
the East.
Confronted with these issues, the Virginia legislature 
selected a new committee of commerce in the Spring of 1784 to 
settle upon a course of action to lead the state to recovery and 
toward economic growth. The committee submitted their resolution 
in less than a month; given the state of Virginia's commerce in 
1784, the prompt return was no surprise. On May 28, 1784, the
27"Fairfax County Petition Protesting Repeal of the Act to 
Prevent Extensive Credits," (June 18, 1783), The Papers of George 
Mason. 1725-1792. edited by Robert Rutland, (University of North 
Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1970; published for the Institute of 
Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg), II, p. 785
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commerce committee prepared to introduce their plan to the 
legislature. The delegates resumed their seats late in the session 
as the turn in the seasons illuminated the assembly hall.28
The house, according to the order of the day, resolved itself 
into a committee of the whole on the state of the commonwealth to 
hear the report from the committee of commerce. "After sometime 
spent therein," the Speaker of the House resumed his chair and 
recognized the representative for the committee. Mr. Tazewell rose 
and acknowledged the Speaker. Standing in his place among the 
delegates from every county in Virginia, he lifted the resolution 
before him, and addressed the house.
"Resolved, that it is the opinion of this committee, that all 
ships and other vessels trading to this Commonwealth from foreign 
ports, ought to be restricted from entering certain ports for 
loading and unloading.1129
While the commerce committee did not specify the actual 
details of the measure, the delegates in attendance understood its 
general intent. The resolution called for the establishment of a 
few specified ports in Virginia as legal markets for all trade with 
foreign merchants. Restricting access of foreign merchants to a 
few towns would centralize economic activities within entrepot 
areas. The proposal thus risked dividing the consensus over the
28Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of
Virginia (Thomas w. White, Richmond, 1828; hereafter referred to
15
moral dimensions of economic life by reshaping the republican 
system of political economy. Several of the delegates even favored 
the restriction of all trade to Norfolk alone, a limitation that 
would have transformed the economy of the entire region.30 However, 
the possible expansion of Norfolk or Alexandria into a southern 
Philadelphia paled in comparison to the ideological implications 
of restricting trade between planters and merchants. At first 
glance, the proposed Port Bill of 1784 appeared to sacrifice free 
and open trade with Europe for protection against the monopolizing 
tendencies of foreign merchants. For many Revolutionaries, the 
energetic use of government against "free trade" forfeited 
republican principles in favor of a new mercantilism.
After completing the address, Mr. Tazewell delivered the 
resolution to the clerk's table, where it was read once more into 
the record. James Madison listened as the words he helped to write 
less than a week before echoed through the assembly hall. Recently 
returned from the Congress at Philadelphia, Madison provided the 
group of ten Virginians on the new commerce committee with a focus 
for their policy. Aware of the growing economic crisis in the 
republic, Madison recognized that the uncertainty in Virginia 
mandated unusual action.31 The return of the English merchants and
30James Madison may be included as one of those who favored the 
establishment of Norfolk as the only port of entry. See the letter 
of Edmund Randolph to Thomas Jefferson, (May 15, 1784), Boyd,
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VII, p. 260-261.
31James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (December 10, 1783), 
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VII, p. 377.
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Scots factors brought dependence and debt once again to Virginia. 
The combined effect on tobacco prices of western expansion and 
British commercial dominance contributed to the need for 
legislative action against foreign mercantile interests. Merchant 
dominance over the planters7 lives concerned Madison more than any 
other consideration. He believed the British strategy after the 
war was an intentional effort to monopolize the Chesapeake trade 
for the purpose of encouraging debt, dependence and economic ruin. 
He postulated that "the ready admission she [Great Britain] found 
into our commerce without paying any price for it has suggested the 
policy of aiming at the entire benefit of it." 32
Madison may have been eager to deflect any blame away from 
Congress for the disastrous course of trade after the war, as he 
served as a Virginia delegate to Congress in 1783. However, he did 
have cause beyond simple self-interest to blame the British and not 
the Americans. Writing from Philadelphia at the time, he believed 
that "the other nations of Europe seem to have more honorable views 
towards our commerce, sundry advances having been made to our 
Ministers on that subject."33
Madison believed the Port Bill would solve five fundamental 
problems in Virginia7s economy. First, limiting foreign trade to 
the enumerated ports forced European merchants to compete for
32James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (September 20, 1783),
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, VI, p . 338.
33James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (December 10, 1783),
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI, p. 377.
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Virginia's business. Competition discouraged debt and dependency 
by promoting an open market. Second, Madison believed that 
concentrating merchants in a few ports would create a seller's 
market in the short-run. Limiting the access of merchants to 
Virginia's planters would appreciate the price of tobacco and 
promised to end the depression of the early 1780s. Continued 
western expansion threatened to wipe out these short-term gains 
with a long-term depreciation in the price of tobacco over the 
following decade. However, Madison believed that the Port Bill's 
initial upward pressure on prices would anticipate the depreciation 
from expanding supply, and thus stabilize the market in the long- 
run. Third, Madison hoped the removal of the debt cycle and the 
continued profitability of tobacco would support a virtuous yeoman 
class and insure the viability of a republican political economy 
in Virginia. Fourth, the elimination of the debt cycle would also 
solidify the credit position of Virginians, and facilitate the 
settlement of outstanding debts to foreign creditors in Europe. 
Finally, Madison hoped to encourage the development of a native 
class of retailers to replace the Scots factors along the 
Tidewater.
Madison was convinced that whenever British merchants 
negotiated directly with an indebted planter, the price of tobacco 
suffered. In a free market, competition would have appreciated the 
price to its "natural” level. He observed that while tobacco 
prices in Virginia in 1784 were high, ranging from 36/hundredweight 
to 42/hundredweight, the price in Philadelphia and Baltimore was
18
15/. to 20/. higher on the Virginia staple.34 He was aware of the 
difference in prices from his own transactions through Samuel 
House, who sold tobacco for the Madison family account in 
Philadelphia. Although he would rather have sold his tobacco in 
Alexandria, the closest Virginia port, economic necessity required 
the services of Mr. House.35
Madison's personal transactions in Philadelphia highlighted 
a problem often overlooked by his fellow planters in Virginia. The 
price of tobacco following the war remained high for some time, but 
the continuing British dominance robbed Virginia of enormous 
profits. He could only lament that Virginia's "trade was never 
more completely monopolised by Great Britain when it was under the 
direct control of the British Parliament" than it was after the
34James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (August 20, 1784), 
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 103. 
Richard Henry Lee cautioned Madison that the higher prices in 
Philadelphia were the result of "sinking speculators," and not of 
European inequity. (RHL to JM, (August 11, 1785), VIII, p. 340). 
Madison discounted this theory as misinformed. (JM to Ambrose 
Madison, (December 15, 1785), VIII, p. 443). Furthermore, the
price of tobacco was higher, sometimes substantially higher in 
Virginia than in Maryland during the entire period 1750-1775, when 
the Glasgow merchants were at their height. (Kulikoff, Tobacco and 
Slaves, p. 80). Madison does not account for this when he claims 
the commercial center at Baltimore would necessarily receive 
competitive prices. Finally, a large part of the reason for the 
fall in tobacco prices in 1785-1786 was the disastrous contract 
between Robert Morris and the Farmers General, and not the British 
merchants. Morris negotiated a three year contract for 20,000 
hgd/year from 1785-1788 at 24/. (see Thomas Jefferson to Vergennes, 
(August 15, 1785), Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VIII, 
p. 385-393.)
35James Madison to Ambrose Madison, (September 8, 1786),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. IX, p. 120-121.
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war.36 Unfortunately, "the price of our Staple since the peace is 
another cause of inattention in the planters to the dark side of 
our commercial affairs."37 Madison warned that the presence of the 
Glasgow merchants would drive the price down, and over the next two 
years, the fall in the price of tobacco seemed to merit these 
fears. By Christmas eve 1785, the price reached the break-even 
point at 20/., and the depression continued in Virginia.38 The Port 
Bill promised to end the downward pressure on tobacco prices and 
alleviate the commonwealth's beleaguered economy.
The expansion to the West also threatened to make the 
cultivation of tobacco unprofitable for the independent planter in 
the East. Madison recognized that "it [is] becoming more apparent 
every day that the richness of the soil and the fitness of the 
climate on the western waters will in a few years both reduce the 
price and engross the culture of [tobacco]."39 As the amount of
36James Madison to James Monroe, (June 21, 1785),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 307
37James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (August 20, 1785), 
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 344
38James Madison to James Madison, Sr., (December 24, 1785),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 454. 
The break-even point of 20/. was identified by Forrest MacDonald, 
E Pluribus Unum: The Formation of the American Republic. 1776-
1790, (Boston, 1965), p. 70. Madison kept a vigil over the
fluctuations in the price of tobacco in this period. See JM to 
Ambrose Madison, (January 21, 1786), VIII, p. 470; JM to Thomas 
Jefferson, (January 22, 1786), VIII, p. 481; JM to Thomas
Jefferson, (March 18, 1786), VIII, p. 503; JM to James Monroe, 
(May 12, 1786), IX, p. 50.
39James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (August 20, 1784),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 104.
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unsettled land in the trans-Appalachian region was roughly egual 
to the amount of settled land in the east, he assumed that the 
population of the country would double.40 This expansion would 
double the amount of tobacco produced in America without a 
concurrent increase in the number of markets for the crop. Since 
the steady demand "for Tobacco, indigo, rice, hemp, Indian Corn, 
lumber &c produced by the U.S. for exportation will neither precede 
or keep pace with their increase, the price of them must naturally 
sink in favor of those who consume them."41
In 1784, Madison calculated that without a commercial center 
like Baltimore or Philadelphia, the steady increase in settled 
western lands would depreciate tobacco prices from 35/. to under 
20/. within twenty years. This alone did not compromise the long­
term profitability of tobacco because prices would remain above the 
break-even point. However, the renewed British dominance in the 
Chesapeake after the war had already driven tobacco prices down to 
20/. by December 1785. Thus any additional downward pressure on 
prices from western expansion represented an immediate threat to 
the profitability of tobacco in the 1780s. The combined effect of 
western expansion and British dominance on agricultural prices
40James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (August 20, 1784), 
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 106-
107. The notion of the population doubling was a commonly accepted 
belief in the late colonial period. See Drew McCoy, "Benjamin 
Franklin's Vision of a Republican Political Economy for America," 
The William and Mary Quarterly. 3d series, XXXV (1978), 
esp. p. 608-610.
41James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (August 20, 1784),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 107
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would force Virginians to either abandon tobacco for manufacturing 
or accept an increasing level of debt to maintain an agricultural 
economy. However, if ports of entry could be restricted to a 
limited number of markets, prices would first appreciate to 50/. 
or 60/. in the 1780s with the decline of British mercantile 
dominance, and then only fall to 25/. or 30/. from western 
expansion. While the Port Bill could not prevent a fall in tobacco 
prices from 1785-1810, by moderating the fall it would maintain 
profit margins into the next century. The republic would be 
preserved.42
Tobacco also supported an independent yeoman class, which 
insured the viability of a republican political economy in 
Virginia. Incorporated from the radical Whig tradition of early 
eighteenth-century England, the doctrine of "republicanism" 
stressed the balance between prerogative and liberty as necessary 
to a stable social order. When governments invested all power in 
the royal prerogative of the monarch, society quickly fell into 
tyranny. When governments invested all power in the liberty of the 
people, society quickly fell into anarchy.43 In America before the
42Madison believed that western expansion was essential to 
avoid the erosion of virtue from commercial development. By 
expanding through space, he hoped to evade economic development 
through time. However, the continued influence of the merchants 
threatened to undermine the basis for this expansion. See McCoy, 
The Elusive Republic, esp. p. 185-259
43For a further discussion of republicanism see Richard Price, 
Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty. (London, 1776), 
Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967), J.G.A. Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment:____Florentine Political Thought and the
Atlantic Republican Tradition. (Princeton University Press,
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war, royal appointments undermined the social and political 
hierarchy of the colonial elites, and the interference of the Scots 
threatened the economic sovereignty of the planters. While the 
Revolution removed the king, it had only exiled the Scots, and in 
1783, they had returned.
The accumulation of debts to British merchants violated a 
basic premise of republicanism. Economic dependency compromised 
a planter's ability to sacrifice "individual interests to the 
greater good of the whole."44 Indebtedness could force a planter 
to adopt political positions favorable to the commercial desires 
of the British merchants in exchange for an alleviation of his 
financial burden. The fear of this kind of corruption prompted the 
Revolutionaries to designate ownership of property as the agency 
of liberation. Possession of property meant independence from 
others for support? independence guaranteed a citizen's ability 
to pursue the public good, because he was no longer compelled to 
follow the private interests of those who supported him. The 
dominance achieved by the British merchants after the war 
threatened to destabilize the republican economy. Just as 
"Americans in 1776 were resolved to destroy the capacity of their 
rulers ever again to determine the ranks of the social order,"
Princeton, 1975), and esp. Gordon Wood, The Creation of the 
American Republic. 1776^1787. (WW Norton, New York, 1972). For 
thorough review of the literature on republicanism, see Robert E. 
Shalhope, "Republicanism and Early American Historiography," The 
William and Mary Quarterly. 3d Series, XXXIX, (October 1982), 
p. 334-356.
44Gordon Wood, Creation of the American Republic, p. 15, 53
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Virginians in 1784 sought to eliminate the power of the British 
merchants to control their economy.45
The credit position of Virginia in Europe presented another 
problem in the commonwealth's economy. Madison complained that 
before the war, Scots traders passed "the essential legislation" 
for Virginia at court days in Williamsburg, when they set tobacco 
prices, fixed exchange rates, and settled accounts.46 After the 
war, Madison was aware that the indebtedness of the planters and 
"the monopoly [of the Scots] which formerly tyrannized over 
[Virginia]...left wounds which are not yet healed." Edmund 
Randolph echoed these fears about American debts to British 
creditors "if recoverable immediately, may they not endanger us, 
by the possibility of a relapse into the arms of Great Britain if 
not by a restoration of dependence, at least by a destructive 
connection?"47 Madison agreed that "the numerous debts due from the 
people, and which...they are immediately liable for" provided the 
mechanism by which the merchants could regain their control over 
Virginia in the courts and "may possibly be the instruments for 
reestablishing their dependence."48 For this reason, the courts
45Wood, Creation of the American Republic, p. 148.
46Marc Egnal and Joseph Ernst, "An Economic Interpretation of 
the American Revolution," The William and Marv Quarterly. 3d 
series, XXIX (1972), p. 25-26.
47Edmund Randolph to James Madison, (March 29, 1783),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VI, p. 416
48James Madison to Edmund Randolph, (May 20, 1783),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 62
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remained closed in Virginia throughout the 1780s. However, the 
debate over the opening of the courts provided a parallel 
discussion to the debate over the Port Bill. While Madison 
supported the legal address of outstanding debts, he hoped that the 
issue would not become a chronic problem in Virginia. The opening 
of the courts would have demonstrated commitment on behalf of the 
planters to honor their debts to British merchants and at the same 
time maintain the confidence of foreign lenders in extending future 
credit to Virginians. To assure that future credit would not 
produce a second debt cycle, the Port Bill concentrated trade 
between planters and foreign merchants in specified locations where 
competition would eliminate British dominance. Both measures, the 
Port Bill and the proposed reopening of the courts, served to 
fortify the commercial standing of Virginia before the world. 
Advocates for the Port Bill hoped to settle the old guestion of 
debts and dependency in a respectable way and eliminate what they 
believed to have been the root cause of the debt cycle. The Port 
Bill complemented the move to reopen the courts and satisfied the 
ideological fears of republicans.
Concentrating the export trade at Norfolk also encouraged the 
development of a native class of retailers to replace the Scots 
factors along the Tidewater. The factor system undermined 
Virginia's "human capital.” The dominance of Scots factors and 
English merchants who traded directly with planters inhibited the 
development of a large mercantile class. The system eliminated 
competition from independent middlemen and drained the Chesapeake
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of its "ablest commercial talents." When a Scots factor became 
successful, "he thought of returning to Glasgow and becoming a 
partner in a Virginia house."49 While the stabilization of the 
price of tobacco and insurance of independence ranked as the most 
important aspects of the Port Bill, the division of retailers from 
importers was crucial to the subsequent development of Virginia 
commerce. Madison believed this separation represented "the only 
radical cure for credit to the consumer."50
Madison was not alone in blaming Virginia's commercial 
difficulties on the return of the British merchants. George Mason 
scrutinized the motives of the British merchants when his son, 
Thomson Mason, and William Allison tried to establish a snuff 
factory. He feared "the Attempts of the British Merchants [to 
ruin] such a Manufacture here." To assist the fledgling industry, 
"they [Th. Mason and Allison] have presented [a] Petition to the 
Assembly, for laying a Duty up[on] Snuff imported from Foreign 
Countrys."51 Benjamin Harrison described the British merchants as 
"locusts that are crouding us here as so many emissaries sent to 
sound out inclinations and to poison the minds of our people." 
Their ultimate goal was to bring Virginia "back to their old and
49Price, "The Rise of Glasgow in the Chesapeake Tobacco Trade, 
1707-1775," The William and Mary Quarterly. 3d Series, XXI (1954), 
p. 197-198.
50James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (August 20, 1785),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 345
51George Mason to William Cabell (May 6, 1783), Rutland,
The Papers of Georae Mason. II, p. 769.
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destructive paths.”52 These fears recalled the reasons cited by the 
House of Delegates in 1777 when they exiled the British merchants. 
The war had reached a critical stage, and Virginians felt the 
necessity to remove "all the natives of Great Britain who were 
partners with, factors, agents, storekeepers, assistant store­
keepers, or clerks,” for otherwise they would have "frequent 
opportunities of seducing and corrupting the minds of the people."53 
Richard Henry Lee did not trust the insidious influence of foreign 
mercantile interests, as "the Spirit of Commerce is a Spirit of 
Avarice, and whatever the power is given the will certainly follows 
to monopolize, to engross, and to take every possible advantage."54 
British merchants wish only "for monopoly - And the more especially 
as we have no compensation to make." Lee "believed that we may 
dispose them to be reasonable, by a very careful, and considerate 
restraining of their Trade, in all cases where we shall not injure 
ourselves more than them by the restraint."55
Many suspected a covert plan behind the merchants' activities,
“Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in Congress, 
(September 26, 1783), Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James 
Madison, VII, p. 359.
“Virginia Gazette (Williamsburg), January 3, 1777: quoted in
Emory Evans, "Private Indebtedness and the Revolution in Virginia, 
1776-1796," The William and Mary Quarterly. 3d series, XXVIII 
(1971), p. 352
“Richard Henry Lee to -, (October 10, 1785), The Letters of 
Richard Henry Lee, edited James Curtis Ballagh, (DaCapo Press, New 
York, 1970; reprinted from the original series published 1911- 
1914), II, p. 389.
“Richard Henry Lee to James Madison, (August 11, 1785),
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry Lee. II, p. 383.
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but Arthur Campbell openly accused the British of a conspiracy. 
"If my intelligence from a distant Correspondent, is right," 
Campbell told Madison, "Great Britain from the moment she 
acknowledged our independence, set about devising means to render 
it of no avail." The essence of this perfidious plot resided in 
"what she has already done, by introducing luxury, draining our 
money, impairing public credit, and destroying public spirit." The 
threat required the vigilance of every patriot in defending the 
republic, for one "may discover, that she [Great Britain] will be 
systematical, in aiming at our destruction."56
Establishing a single port at Norfolk would encourage the 
growth of that city as a major commercial center. Writing in 
response to a query from Jefferson, George Washington expressed no 
anxiety over the possibility of a southern Philadelphia arising. 
He believed "[Commerce] has its advantages and disadvantages, but 
which of them preponderates is not the question." Washington 
realized that "from trade our citizens will not be restrained, and 
therefore it behooves us to place it in the most convenient 
channels, under proper regulation, freed as much as possible from 
these vices which luxury, the consequence of wealth and power, 
naturally introduce."57 The Port Bill succeeded in the goal of
56Arthur Campbell to James Madison, (October 28, 1783), 
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 383.
57George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, (March 29, 1784),
The Writings of Georae Washington from the Original Manuscript 
Sources. 1745-1799. edited by John Fitzgerald, (Washington, 1938), 
XXVII, p. 376
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regulating Virginia's commerce to Washington's satisfaction, and 
he supported the measure ’’with some alterations." He feared that 
"without it, the Trade thereof I conceive will ever labor and 
languish. "58
Jefferson also supported the restrictions and contributed 
another argument to Madison's defense of the bill. He claimed that 
limiting trade to Norfolk would "bring to a point the proper 
subjects of taxation, and reduce the army of taxgatherers almost 
to a single hand." The isolation of the merchants to a single 
location in Virginia also enhanced the prospects for the bill. His 
reasoning closely followed the explanations provided in Notes on 
the State of Virginia for the superiority of the yeoman farmer. 
He argued that "the proportion which the aggregate of the other 
classes of citizens bears in any state to that of the husbandmen, 
is the proportion of its unsound to its healthy parts, and is a 
good enough barometer whereby to measure its degree of 
corruption."59 The removal of European merchants from interaction 
with the general public helped to preserve the "healthy parts" of 
society.
Not all Virginians agreed with Jefferson's arguments. Any 
defense of the Port Bill that drew attention to its effects upon 
the collection of taxes undermined support for the measure in the
58George Washington to James Madison,
Fitzgerald, The Writings of Georcre Washington. XXVIII, p. 336
59Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Vircrinia. edited by 
William Peden, (WW Norton, New York, 1982).
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House of Delegates. George Mason, Richard Henry Lee, and other 
republicans opposed the Port Bill on ideological grounds and out 
of concern for its effects upon the economic development of 
Virginia. All agreed that the cycles of debt and dependency as 
well as the increasingly sour economic condition of the 
Commonwealth required quick and deliberate action to save the 
republic, but for Mason and Lee, the Port Bill was not the way to 
go. The continuing debate over the Port Bill sparked discussion 
over the nature of free trade and ruptured the republican 
conception of political economy in favor of a new synthesis.
CHAPTER TWO
THE END OF REPUBLICAN CONSENSUS
After Tazewell introduced the resolution to restrict the 
access of foreign merchants to Virginia's ports, the proposal 
quickly generated discontent throughout the commonwealth. The 
House of Delegates resolved for the legislation in the affirmative 
on June 17, 1784, by a vote of sixty-four to fifty-eight, but the 
final draft of the bill included a clause that deferred the 
execution of the law until June 10, 1786.1 The delay in the
implementation of the Port Bill provided its numerous opponents 
with the opportunity to diminish support for the measure. The 
ripples of dissent soon reached the marketplace that summer and 
provided an uncertain future for Madison's plan to save the 
republic. Usually people bustling about the streets of Richmond 
directed their attention to the "weather, the market price of 
tobacco, and horses for riding, racing, pulling or plowing."2 By
1JHDV. General Assembly begun at Richmond, May 3, 1784, p. 61; 
also see William Walker Hening, ed., The Statutes at Large; Being 
a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia. (Richmond, 1823; 
reprinted for the Jamestown Foundation, University Press of 
Virginia, Charlottesville, 1969), XI, p. 402-404
2William Fogg to - Fogg, (October 24, 1786), University of 
Virginia Library: Quoted in Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of 
James Madison. IX, p. 147
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August 1784 however, the Port Bill became a focus for political 
arguments from the local merchant's store to the House of 
Delegates. Madison recognized the increasing level of public 
discourse on matters of trade and commented that "the act which 
produces the most agitation and discussion is that which restrains 
foreign trade to enumerated ports."3
The continuing debate over the Port Bill through 1787 sparked 
a discussion concerning the proper role for commercial development 
in a republican society. A consensus on that issue eluded 
Virginians for most of the decade. The disagreement over the 
effects of the Port Bill demonstrated how economic concerns shaped 
republican conceptions of society in a substantially different way 
from social or political interests. Republicans of all stripes 
believed in the elimination of mercantilist restraints on commerce 
to free planters from dependence on merchants. While Madison, 
Jefferson, and Henry supported republican regulations on trade to 
preserve public virtue and the economic viability of the planter 
class, Mason and Lee opposed such regulations as a threat to virtue 
because they encouraged the development of commercial centers. 
Advocates for the Port Bill sought to create a native merchant 
class to save the planters from foreign merchants, while its 
adversaries believed that any merchant class would cripple the 
planters and undermine the republican social order.
Geographic considerations forced an increase in the number of
3James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (August 20, 1784),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 102
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ports of entry beyond the single port at Norfolk that Madison 
favored. During the 1760s, the James and York river basins 
accounted for over fifteen percent of the tobacco exported from the 
Chesapeake. By 1784 those rivers contributed less than four 
percent, and the Piedmont doubled its share to half of the total 
exports.4 Jefferson realized that "friends of Petersburg, Richmond, 
Fredericksburg, and Alexandria may possibly unite to prevent 
exclusive privileges being given to Norfolk." He believed that 
"all the country below these which compose one third of the 
legislature are interested in the prosperity of Norfolk? and all 
the country above stands indifferent but to the general interest."5 
Madison "made a warm struggle for the establishment of Norfolk and 
Alexandria" as the only ports of entry, but political necessity 
forced him to compromise with delegates from elsewhere in Virginia 
to save the measure.6 The bill presented to the House on June 9 
stipulated that "the ships and other vessels trading to this 
commonwealth [Virginia] from foreign ports... shall enter, clear 
out, load and unload, at the following places, to wit: Norfolk and
Portsmouth as one port, Bermuda hundred, Tappahanock, York Town,
4Alan Kulikoff, Tobacco and Slaves. p. 157; also see Jacob 
Price, France and the Chesapeake: A History of the French Tobacco
Monopoly, 1764-1791, and of Its Relationship to the British and 
American Tobacco Trade. (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 
1973), II, chapter 28
5Thomas Jefferson to G.K. van Hogendorp, (May 1784),
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VII, p. 215
6James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (July 3, 1784),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 93
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or Alexandria, and at no other ports or places therein." This 
provided one port of entry at the mouth of each of the five major 
rivers. The preamble incorporated Jefferson's concerns, stating 
that the purpose of the bill was not only to restrict access of 
foreign merchants to certain ports, but "the revenue arising from 
commerce would also thereby be more certainly collected."7
After the initial bill passed the House in 1784, opposition 
to Madison's plan involved broader issues than local political 
requirements. Advocates of the bill argued that free access by 
merchants in a common marketplace would raise the price of tobacco 
from the artificially deflated prices under British monopoly. 
Higher prices meant prosperity for planters, and the opportunity 
to develop republican virtue within the character of the people. 
While George Mason agreed that the price of tobacco would rise, he 
insisted that the additional costs to the planters involved in 
transporting and warehousing their crops in Norfolk would negate 
any benefit to gross revenues. As merchants faced the same 
problems, the price of manufactures would also rise, further 
eroding the economic benefit to the planter. Mason questioned the 
General Assembly, "Can imported goods come cheaper to the consumer, 
or the produce of our lands bear a better price, by being burthened 
with the double charges of commissions, freight, ensurance, and 
warehouse rent?" Considering that the weight of these expenses 
diminished profits, Mason wondered "are not such paradoxes, however
7Hening, Statutes, XI, p. 402-403
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artfully disguised, or plausibly explained, sufficient to shock the 
creed even of the most credulous?"8
An even greater concern for Mason was the bill's effect on the 
distribution of wealth. The costs of transporting tobacco 
privileged planters in the immediate areas of the enumerated ports. 
Those along navigable water but further away from the designated 
ports would be stripped of these natural advantages. Madison 
recognized the validity of the argument and urged concurrent 
legislation for internal improvements to Virginia's transportation 
network. He introduced a resolution for opening roads to market 
towns in December 1784 to minimize any additional costs to planters 
in the interior. The assembly did not approve the measure, and 
even if the house voted in the affirmative, the concession would 
not have satisfied Madison's opponents.9 Mason insisted that the 
Port Bill required additional legislation to restructure land taxes 
to prevent a shortfall in revenues to the government. While Mason 
considered "robbing" planters of natural advantages itself an "act 
of injustice, oppression, and tyranny," the required adjustments 
to tax laws risked "destroying a system universally approved." The 
clash of political interests over the issue would result in 
"general discontent, confusion, anarchy, and perhaps, convulsion
8Protest by "A Private Citizen" against the Port Bill, 
(November 1786), Rutland, The Papers of George Mason. II, 
p. 859-862
9"Resolution for Opening Roads to Market Towns,"
(December 1784), Hutchinson and Rachal, Papers of James Madison. 
VIII, p. 207-208
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in the state." He also speculated that the Port Bill would 
impoverish planters along the Potomac river, as merchants who 
traded formerly in both Maryland and Virginia would load 
exclusively in Maryland rather than relocate their trade to 
Norfolk.10 Mason realized that the British merchants represented 
a possible threat to republican virtue and that their presence 
might encourage a return to subservience under George III. 
However, he also believed the Port Bill would only accelerate the 
degenerative process and drive Virginians into the arms of their 
former king in the wake of economic ruin.
Mason also appealed to the republican notion that the effects 
of commercial development corrupted virtue. The country opposition 
in England did not oppose commerce, but the effects they believed 
resulted from mercantile activity, including commercial wars, land 
taxes, factions, graft, and debt. Mercantilists argued that 
merchants represented the most important element in advancing 
national wealth. Commerce contributed to the general good through 
the operation of private interests, whose aggregate effect 
benefitted the public. Joseph Addison recognized that "there are 
not more useful Members in a Commonwealth than Merchants. They 
knit Mankind together in a mutual intercourse of good offices, 
[and] distribute the Gifts of Nature." However, their unregulated 
enterprises also favored commercial over landed interests, which
10"Protest by a Private Citizen," (November 1786), 
Rutland, The Papers of George Mason. II, p. 860-862
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threatened to undermine the virtue republican ideology presumed.11 
Mason followed this argument and asked "if virtue is the vital 
principle of a republic, and it cannot long exist, without 
frugality, probity and strictness of morals? will the manners of 
populous commercial cities be favorable to the principles of our 
free government?"12 The argument hinged on the evolutionary theory 
of social development advanced by Montesqieu and fully articulated 
by Adam Smith. Smith identified four stages of society: hunting,
pasturage, agriculture, and commerce. As social systems matured, 
nations followed a natural pattern of change from one stage to the 
next. Eighteenth-century theorists associated the third, or 
agricultural stage, with American society, and the final commercial 
stage with Great Britain. The development of a fully commercial 
society was inevitable in America under this model, but republicans 
hoped to prolong the agricultural stage to avoid as long as 
possible the corruption of virtue.13
John Brown's manuscript, "An Estimate of the Manners and 
Principles of the Times," typified republican attitudes towards 
commercialism. Brown found that the middle stages of development 
promoted convenience, arts, science, equality of the laws, and a
aiCathy Matson and Peter Onuf, A Union of Interests: Political
and Economic Thought in Revolutionary America. (University of 
Kansas Press, Lawrence, 1990), p. 17-20
“"Protest by a Private Citizen," (November 1786),
Rutland, The Papers of George Mason. II, p. 862
“See the discussion in McCoy's The Elusive Republic, 
esp. p. 18-24
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diffusion of the material prosperity. Agriculture allowed the 
cultivation of virtue which maintained freedom. Commercial society 
bred "superfluity and vast wealth, promoting avarice, gross luxury, 
and effeminacy among the higher ranks of men."14 Progress was a 
double-edged sword, intrinsically linked to the decay of society. 
Republicans thus denounced urbanization as symptomatic of a corrupt 
and withering state, and Mason believed that the Port Bill 
precipitated the introduction of commercial forms. While the final 
draft incorporated five locations as ports of entry instead of a 
single commercial center at Norfolk, even this concession ceded 
ground in the struggle to contain corruption. Mason urged the 
delegates to consider that people are "more miserable and 
contemptible in the last, than in the early and middle stages" of 
evolution. "And is it not safer and wiser to leave things to the 
natural progress of time, than to hasten them, prematurely?"15
Madison believed that restricting the access of foreign 
merchants was the only way to halt an explosion of commercial 
development through capital investments. This solution appeared 
unsound to Mason, who believed the consequent development of 
commercial centers, however few in number, created the same forces 
that Madison designed the Port Bill to eliminate. The model 
republican society represented the "idealization of a traditional, 
static, agricultural economy in which freeholders did not depend
14Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic, p. 33
^"Protest by a Private Citizen," Rutland, The Papers of George 
Mason, II, p. 862-863
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on credit at interest or risk their property in speculative
enterprises." Republicans recognized that "the lasting prosperity 
of the landed interest depends upon foreign commerce," but it 
appeared to Mason that many of his countrymen were prepared to 
elevate commerce beyond a complementary role and into an 
independent economic force divorced from the landed interests. At 
best, this move would sacrifice the patient to cure the disease, 
and might even encourage the growth of manufacturing over
pasturage.16
Madison did not ease these fears. He complained to James
Monroe that "it is difficult notwithstanding to make them
[Virginians] sensible of the utility of establishing a Philadelphia 
or a Baltimore among ourselves, as one indispensable step towards 
relief."17 What appeared to Madison as the means to economic growth 
appeared to Richard Henry Lee and other republicans as the sure 
route to social decline. While Madison claimed that his intentions 
centered on the preservation of the landed interests, Lee and Mason 
recognized that the Port Bill threatened the traditional social 
order in favor of a commercial society.18 Richard Henry Lee voiced
16Matson and Onuf, A Union Of Interests, p. 13-17
17James Madison to James Monroe, (June 21, 1785),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 307
18Drew McCoy argued in The Elusive Republic that, like 
Jefferson, Madison defended the interests of the landed aristocracy 
into the nineteenth century. The Louisiana Purchase and the War 
of 1812 are thus manifestations of the attempt to preserve the 
landed order. This interpretation distances Madison from his 
former association with Hamilton accorded by previous historians. 
However, given the positions taken over the Port Bill controversy, 
it is not surprising how Lee and others could have seen Madison as
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his opposition to the free reign of commercial development during 
the war, and it seemed that Madison sought to perpetuate that 
crisis. In 1779, Lee commented to Mason that "the inundation of 
money appears to have overflowed virtue, and I fear will bury the 
liberty of America in the same grave...the demon of avarice, 
extortion, and fortune-making seizes all ranks.”19 Establish a 
commercial center at Norfolk and others along each of the rivers, 
and before long Virginia would resemble Holland, "an immense heap 
of Mammon, where every weakness prevails consequent upon excessive 
wealth."20 Mason agreed with the bleak prognosis, as Holland "is 
well known to be a republic," yet "it has arisen to uncommon power 
and wealth."21 He believed consolidation of power in the 
stadtholder in Holland augmented the power of the commercial 
interests, destroying any virtue remaining in the state. While 
Madison did not propose the ascendancy of the merchants to 
political dominance, the creation of a southern Philadelphia would 
augment the influence of the mercantile interests within the 
commonwealth by consolidating their power in the Chesapeake.
a promoter of the same agenda Hamilton championed.
19Richard Henry Lee to George Mason, (June 9, 1779),
Rutland, The Papers of George Mason. II, p. 513-514
20Richard Henry Lee to Thomas McKean, (August 25, 1781), 
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry Lee. II, p. 247-248
21Debates and other Proceedings of the Convention of Virginia. 
Convened at Richmond. on Monday the 2d of June 1788.... 
(Petersburg, 1788? 2d edition, Richmond, 1805 by Ritchie & Worsley 
and Augustine Davis), Special Collections, Swem Library,
The College of William and Mary, p. 194
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Without enumerated ports of entry, merchants would scatter across 
the state, and their influence could be diffused. Limiting the 
economic opportunities of the British merchants to individual 
interaction preserved their complimentary role in the tobacco 
trade. Concentration of their resources in enumerated ports risked 
the development of capital markets and speculation.
While the social consequences of the Port Bill worried Mason 
more than any other consideration, it is mistake to assume that 
this opposition represented the majority opinion of those in 
dissent. The most vehement and unified opposition to Madison's 
plan originated in northern Virginia, and throughout the 1780s, 
planters along the northern neck were unceasing in their complaints 
to the legislature over its economic repercussions.22 The most 
pressing argument against the Port Bill was its limitations on the 
doctrine of free trade. The continued presence of restraints upon 
the free flow of commercial trade bothered Richard Henry Lee, who 
"grievously...lament[ed] that this is fully and fatally the case 
in our unfortunate country." Such restrictions only caused 
hardship and inequality, as "the free nature and genius of commerce 
abhors and shuns restraint." He believed "that in young commercial 
states, to embarrass Trade with heavy imposts or other clogs, is
22Dissent also concentrated around the immediate area of 
Norfolk's rival ports. See W. Augustus Low, Virginia in the 
Critical Period. 1783-1789. (unpubl. PhD. diss., University of 
Iowa, 1941), p. 146 and map VI, p. 215
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effectually to demolish it."23 Lee's protests aimed primarily at 
the attempts by the Congress at Philadelphia to implement an impost 
tax on imported goods, but the ideological opposition carried over 
to the debate on the Port Bill. Abandoning restraint as a solution 
to Virginia's commercial difficulties would place trade "upon more 
liberal principles," and allow commerce to be "less shackled than 
it is."24 Restricting foreign merchants embarrassed the commercial 
relations between Virginia and Europe and substituted the 
domination of British vessels for those of New England traders.25
Madison recognized that self-interest motivated the 
ideological commitment to free trade on the part of planters along 
the northern neck. He accused the Lees and Masons of wishing to 
gain advantages from "large ships coming up and lying at their 
usual stations in the Rivers," and using free trade as a political 
tool to convince other Virginians that "trade ought in all cases 
to be left to regulate itself."26 This strategy maintained the 
status quo where the Lees and Masons profited from economies of 
scale. Clearly a Scots merchant would be willing to give a great 
planter a better price than he would a small planter, because the
23Richard Henry Lee to James Monroe, (January 5, 1784), 
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry Lee. II, p. 289
24Richard Henry Lee to Thomas Jefferson, (May 16, 1785), 
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry Lee. II, p. 358
25Richard Henry Lee to John Jay, (September 11, 1785),
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry Lee. II, p. 389
26James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (August 20, 1784),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 102
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crop from a large plantation could fill a greater portion of the 
hull in a merchant ship. These deals dramatically reduced a 
captain's turn-around time, and while the merchant lost some gross 
revenues from the higher price, the diminished operating costs 
increased the net return and thus improved profit margins. Madison 
considered it improbable that the great planters along the northern 
neck would support the measure. He commented that "should it [the 
Port Bill] escape... it will be owing to a few striking and 
undeniable facts." The price on tobacco was high immediately 
following the war, however "this will not last if debt outstrips 
[the] planter."27 Those most likely to fall victim to the price 
deflation were small planters upon whose support Madison's plan to 
save the republic depended. The grand purpose behind the scheme 
concerned the extension of the republican form of political economy 
over both time and space. While western expansion promised the 
creation of a new yeomen class in Kentucky, the Port Bill 
guaranteed the maintenance of the yeomen class in Virginia. The 
unenlightened self-interest of the northern neck elites disrupted 
the cultivation of virtue on the farms of America.
27James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (August 20, 1784),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison, VIII, p. 103
CHAPTER THREE
THE PRINCIPLE OF FAIR TRADE
Many historians have discussed the transformation of 
political life in America from colonial subservience to the 
emergence of a democratic society following the Revolution.1 While 
there is some variation among scholars on the way this change 
occurred, a consensus exists that after the Revolution, classical 
liberalism slowly emerged as the dominant theme in American 
political thought.2 Almost from its inception, according to one 
historian, liberalism "has been plural and diverse," encompassing 
a broad ideological spectrum. While the basis for many liberal 
causes varied "both in political positions and in conceptual 
underpinnings," a set of fundamental beliefs provided commonality
1See J. Franklin Jameson, The American Revolution Considered 
as a Social Movement. (Princeton University Press, New York, 1926), 
Daniel Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics. (University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953), Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition 
in America. (Harcourt, Brace, and World, New York, 1955), and 
Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution. (Alfred A. 
Knopf, New York, 1992).
2See Ralph Lerner, "Commerce and Character: The Anglo-American
as New-Model Man," The William and Marv Quarterly. 3d Series, XXXVI 
(January 1979), p. 3-27, Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social 
Order. The Republican Vision of the 1790s. (New York University 
Press, New York, 1984), and esp. Cathy Matson and Peter Onuf,
A Union of Interests:____ Political and Economic Thought in
Revolutionary America. (University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, 1990)
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within this diversity. The doctrine of "free trade" was widely 
accepted as one of these core beliefs.3
Accepting "free trade" as a fundamental tenet of classical 
liberalism confronts the student of American history with an 
interesting problem. Throughout most of its colonial period, 
America remained under the mercantilist system of the British, far 
removed from free trade. As liberalism slowly transformed American 
political ideology in the nineteenth century, commercial laws 
should have conformed to this doctrine. However, the United States 
maintained strongly protectionist policies during the balance of 
its early national period. Almost immediately following the 
Revolution, several legislatures favored considerable restrictions 
on trade with the British, and some even desired these same 
restraints on all foreign trade. In 1783, Benjamin Harrison wrote 
to the Virginia delegation in Philadelphia and "enclosed the copy 
of an act of the [Virginia] general assembly to authorize the 
united states in Congress to adopt certain regulations respecting 
British trade."4 Joseph Jones even remarked in a letter to Thomas 
Jefferson on "the unamity and spirit [with] which the legislature 
passed" the act.5
3J. G. Merquoir, Liberalism, Old and New. (Twayne/s Studies in 
Intellectual and Cultural History, Boston, 1991).
4Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in Congress,
(December 26, 1783), Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI, 
p. 421
5Joseph Jones to Thomas Jefferson, (December 29, 1783),
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI, p. 428
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If liberalism was ascendant during the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, why did "free trade" fare so poorly? 
Were the many notable liberal champions of free trade during the 
nineteenth century among the nation's greatest hypocrites, 
espousing the rhetoric of one dogma and then voting for policies 
that directly contradicted their supposedly lofty principles? It 
seems unlikely that political elites would need or even want to 
ferment ideas about open ports and "free goods" if their real 
purpose was to restrict trade and protect markets. A more 
plausible interpretation of the apparent distance between rhetoric 
and reality argues for a redefinition of the terms "liberal" and 
"free trade." Instead of accepting "free trade" as the set of 
economic principles outlined by David Ricardo, and then trying to 
square those principles with the policy decisions of American 
liberals during the antebellum period, a more fruitful analysis 
would focus on the development of the idea of free trade within 
American political culture. The earliest debates over American 
free trade policies occurred in Virginia during the 1780s, and the 
term acquired meaning long before Ricardo published his classic 
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation in 1817. Thus, it 
should not be surprising that historians find it difficult to 
square U.S. trade policies with Ricardian models of international 
commerce. In leaving aside Ricardian theory, a new definition of 
"free trade" emerges from the policy debate over the Virginia Port 
Bill of 1784.
The restriction of commercial exchange between foreign
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merchants and Virginia planters to enumerated ports certainly 
limited market access. The prohibition of mercantile activity in 
places where commerce once flourished also represented a restraint 
on the freedom of Virginians to trade with foreign merchants. 
Considering these effects, the Port Bill could easily be 
interpreted as an anti-free trade measure. In defense of the bill, 
James Madison even contended that the unrestricted ability of 
foreign merchants to trade in Virginia gave rise to the cycles of 
debt and dependence which threatened to cripple the economy of the 
Old Dominion. For many of the Port Bill's opponents, who defined 
"free trade” as unrestricted access to markets, Madison had 
abandoned the faith. As far as they were concerned, Madison argued 
that the unrestricted access enjoyed by foreign merchants after the 
war caused Virginia's commercial difficulties, and the Port Bill 
would solve the problem by severely limiting free trade.
The restrictions on commerce troubled the delegates assembled 
in Richmond. Richard Henry Lee resisted the Port Bill, as well as 
Madison's later attempts to institute regulations on trade at the 
federal level, because Lee feared such restrictions would lead to 
the dominance of the New England merchants.6 If dependence on one 
group of merchants gave rise to Virginia's commercial difficulties, 
Lee wondered how replacing the British with New England merchants 
solved anything. He insisted that "the free nature and genius of 
commerce abhors and shuns restraint, and that in young commercial
6Richard Henry Lee to John Jay, (September 11, 1785),
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry Lee. II, p. 389
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states, to embarrass Trade with heavy imports or clogs, is 
effectually to demolish it."7 Allow trade to continue unrestricted, 
and "the free nature and genius of commerce" would create a 
competitive market between British, French, New England, and other 
merchants.
To encourage competitiveness, Lee hoped that "Congress has 
seen the propriety of cultivating with assiduity the courts of 
Berlin and Petersburg. The Emperor's subjects are certainly 
capable of being benefitted by a trade immediately with North 
America."8 Already the treaty of commerce made with the French 
"rests upon the liberal ground of fair equality in every part," and 
Lee also concluded that the perceived British dominance resulted 
from Virginia's unwillingness to repeal "her laws that impede the 
recovery of British debts."9 Instead of eliminating free trade, Lee 
believed that, if Virginia paid her debts, "the free nature and 
genius of commerce" would even benefit their trade with the 
British. After the legislature passed the Port Bill, Lee 
complained to Jefferson that "if trade were put upon more liberal 
principles and [be] less shackled than it is," the benefits of
7Richard Henry Lee to James Monroe, (January 5, 1784), 
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry Lee. II, p. 289
8Richard Henry Lee to Thomas McKean, (August 25, 1781), 
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry Lee. II, p. 247-248
9Richard Henry Lee to Patrick Henry, (February 28, 1779), 
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry Lee. II, p. 36;
Richard Henry Lee to James Madison, (November 20, 1784), 
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry Lee. II, p. 299
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commerce might be diffused throughout society.10
Jefferson recognized that "if England can be prevailed on to 
establish a liberal system of commerce, other nations will do so 
too."11 Lee's concept of "free trade" represented the ideal for 
Madison as well, "because the wider...our ports be opened and the 
more extensive the privileges of all competitors in our Commerce, 
the more likely we shall be to buy at cheap and sell at profitable 
rates.1,12 Advocates for the Port Bill thus supported the ideology 
of "free trade," or at least the benefits of reducing restrictions 
on trade to encourage market forces to regulate commerce between 
foreign merchants and Virginia planters. However, opponents of the 
bill wondered how their colleagues could reconcile these 
conflicting positions. If Madison and Jefferson supported free 
trade, how could they also support a measure that denied access to 
foreign merchants in all places except the five enumerated ports? 
Indeed, Madison claimed he supported free trade and favored the 
limitation of foreign commerce to a single port at Norfolk. A 
cursory examination of their views seems to reveal a contradiction. 
However, many of the Port Bill's advocates saw no conflict between 
the doctrine of "free trade," and their support of legal 
restrictions on mercantile access. Madison and Jefferson even
“Richard Henry Lee to Thomas Jefferson, (May 16, 1785),
Ballagh, The Letters of Richard Henry Lee. II, p. 358
“Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, (December 16, 1783), 
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI, p. 386-387
“James Madison to Edmund Randolph, (May 20, 1783),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 59-61
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believed the Port Bill was necessary to establish free trade in 
Virginia.
While unrestricted access to Virginia's markets was desirable, 
Madison and Jefferson found this policy untenable in the 1780s. 
Dominance by the British in America's markets precluded such an 
arrangement. Jefferson complained "that were it certain we could 
be brought to act as one united nation she [Great Britain] would 
make extensive concessions, but under present appearances she has 
no inducement to this as she is not afraid of retaliation."13 Once 
Britain secured its position in the Chesapeake, Virginia's markets 
could no longer be considered "free" because one group of merchants 
dominated the trade. No legal restrictions barred other merchants 
from entering the market, but the return of the Scots factors and 
other British merchants had returned Virginia to its prewar cycles 
of debt and dependence. This eliminated opportunities for other 
merchants to compete for contracts with planters whose outputs were 
already committed to British creditors. George Mason recognized 
that "the Desire of the British Merchants to reinstate themselves 
in their Trade here, will probably prevent their pressing their 
Debtors." However, Madison feared the threat of such action 
provided the British with enough economic leverage to eliminate 
competitors.14 For these reasons Madison complained that "our trade
13Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, (December 16, 1783),
Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI, p. 386-387
14George Mason to Patrick Henry, (May 6, 1783),
Rutland, The Papers of George Mason. II, p. 771
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was never more completely monopolised by Great Britain...than it 
is at this moment," and under these circumstances, he considered 
the unrestricted access of foreign merchants to Virginia's ports 
as detrimental to the ideology of "free trade."15 The unchecked 
admission of the British after 1783 and the continued lack of 
regulations on trade produced a closed system dominated by the 
British instead of the competitive market envisioned by Lee.
Madison agreed with Lee's position that Virginia's commercial 
policies needed to encourage competition and create "free markets." 
Lee endorsed "free access" in an effort to establish a liberal 
system of commerce where governments did not favor certain groups 
over others. He feared that restrictions and regulations 
discouraged competition and promoted closed markets which elevated 
particular individuals to positions of dominance. Lee advocated 
the unrestricted admission of foreign merchants to guarantee free 
access and thus to insure "free trade." Madison's defense of the 
Port Bill established an important distinction for his definition 
of "free trade." For Madison, any policy that inhibited free 
market competition inhibited free trade. He believed that free 
trade suffered whenever a policy allowed one group to achieve 
dominance within a market, and in the 1780s, unrestricted or free 
access permitted the British to secure a dominant position in the 
Chesapeake. To sustain "free trade," Virginia needed to insure 
"equal access," not "free access," and the Port Bill accomplished
15James Madison to James Monroe, (June 21, 1785),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VIII, p. 307
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this goal by first restricting foreign commerce to enumerated 
ports, and then encouraging the development of a native merchant 
class.
The final clause of the Port Bill "specifically encouraged the 
development of native seaman," and for this reason some have 
interpreted the Port Bill as a "classic mercantilist measure."16 
However, this aspect of the law occupies a minor clause and was 
not a matter of considerable interest to either its author or its 
most faithful advocates. Instead of a mercantilist measure, 
proponents of the Port Bill saw the creation of a native class of 
seamen as the only way to establish a competitive trade between New 
England, British and Virginian merchants. Rather than exclude 
British in favor of American merchants to create a closed market, 
the Port Bill limited the British to promote an open market through 
balanced trade. To attain a balance among the merchants from Great 
Britain, New England, and Virginia, the bill "specifically 
encouraged the development of native seamen." In contrast, the 
original British navigation acts, a "classic mercantilist measure," 
prohibited Dutch merchants from trading in any colonial port. The 
Navigation Acts removed Dutch dominance from the region and insured 
a British monopoly of the trans-Atlantic trade. While the Port 
Bill limited British dominance of the Chesapeake, it also 
encouraged competition between all merchants, foreign and American. 
Mercantilism called for the direction of the economy by the state
16Drew McCoy, "The Port Bill of 1784," The Virginia Magazine 
of History and Biography. LXXXIII (July 1975), p. 293
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for the interests of the merchants; the Port Bill provided 
direction of the economy by the state for the protection of the 
planters and the interests of the consumer. The Port Bill should 
thus be interpreted as an attempt to create fair trade by 
eliminating debt and dependence and not as a "classic mercantilist 
measure." If the advocates of the Port Bill intended to create a 
new set of navigation acts, it is unlikely that the measure could 
have passed the House at all. At the ratifying convention for the 
Federal Constitution in 1788, Governor Edmund Randolph, who did not 
support the Port Bill, remarked that "[England's] success in 
commerce is generally ascribed to her navigation act. Virginia 
would not, encumbered as she is, agree to have such an act."17 At 
the time Randolph made the remark, Virginia authorities had 
restricted the access of foreign merchants to enumerated ports for 
nearly two years.
Madison believed the Port Bill provided the necessary 
legislative action to forcibly create an open port and a free 
market by insuring competition through equal access. Restriction 
of market access appeared to some as a protectionist measure, but 
Madison asserted it provided the only feasible way to maintain a 
"free market." Madison argued the measure supported "free trade" 
because it insured free market competition. Restrictions on trade
17Debates and other Proceedings of the Convention of Virginia. 
Convened at Richmond. on Monday the 2d of June. 1788.... 
(Petersburg, 1788; 2d edition, Richmond, 1805 by Ritchie & Worsley 
and Augustine Davis), Special Collections, Swem Library, The 
College of William and Mary, p. 66
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and the limitation of access do not necessarily result in 
restrictions upon the principle of "free trade." "It is possible 
that experience may never recommend an exercise of this right, nor 
do my own sentiments favor in general, any restrictions or 
preferences in matters of commerce," but he claimed that a need for 
government action did arise in Virginia after the war.18 The Port 
Bill restricted access, yet upheld the principle of "free trade" 
without employing the duties and regulations characteristic of the 
British mercantile system. The removal of the Scots factors 
prevented a return to the prewar cycles of debt and dependency, and 
commercial transactions with foreign merchants could no longer 
interfere with the virtuous pursuit of the public good within a 
republican society.
Madison's definition of "free trade" focused the debate on the 
access of foreign merchants, and clearly favored equality at the 
expense of freedom. An absence of legal regulations on commerce 
provides individual merchants and planters with freedom to operate 
within the market, until one group of merchants acquires an 
"unfair" advantage and excludes others from that market. 
Unrestricted access produced commercial domination, not free trade. 
The presence of legal restrictions on commerce limits the freedom 
of individual planters or merchants to participate in the market. 
Government regulations that insure equal opportunity and access to 
every individual who wishes to enter the market encourage
18James Madison to Edmund Randolph, (May 20, 1783),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. VII, p. 61
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competition and thus support free trade. In the case of Virginia 
after the war, such measures became necessary to establishing a 
free market.
While most of the delegates on either side of the debate over 
the Port Bill supported either Lee's or Madison's position on "free 
trade," a protectionist minority existed within the legislature as 
well. Benjamin Harrison resented the continuation of British 
commercial dominance after the war and recommended that "perhaps 
it would not be amiss to prohibit the import of their manufactures 
altogether 'till they open their ports to us." In late 1783 he 
believed the Virginia delegates "disposed to adopt any measures 
that the other states may be willing to come into to bring down the 
British."19 Harrison's proposals even hinted at the possible 
institution of an American navigation act when he suggested that 
Congress prohibit "West India commodities except when brought by 
our own vessels."20
Madison's conceptual treatment of "free trade" established an 
important principle within American political thought. While 
classical liberalism did emerge as an influential ideological 
system in the nineteenth century, American liberals did not insist 
upon an absolute or traditional interpretation of "free trade." 
For Madison, trade could not be free unless it supported market
19Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in Congress,
(November 14, 1783), Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI, 
p. 354
20Benjamin Harrison to the Virginia Delegates in Congress,
(October 3, 1783), Boyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. VI, p. 366
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competition. His position thus outlined a principle that is better 
understood as "fair trade." Armed with this new principle, many 
nineteenth-century American policymakers supported protective 
tariffs while also arguing for the cause of liberalism. Accepting 
these individuals as "fair traders" in the tradition of James 
Madison, their positions on the tariff appear less opportunistic 
and fully within the American liberal tradition. Emily Rosenberg 
has already accounted for this principle in the minds of American 
liberals during the Progressive era. Rosenberg observed that "in 
practice, the faith in liberal rules of economic exchange had an 
important qualification...Those who favored protective tariffs on 
foreign goods expressed their liberalism in terms of equal access, 
or the open door." These progressives did not abandon liberal 
goals in favor of protectionism, but continued the legacy of fair 
trade established in the 1780s. "For much of the twentieth 
century, both low-tariff and protectionist interests agreed that 
equal access for trade and investment, rather than the absolute 
doctrine of free trade, provided the fundamental ingredient of a 
liberal order."21
The recognition of fair, rather than free, trade as a 
fundamental tenet of classical liberalism establishes an important 
analytical tool and provides an antecedent in the early national 
period for America's open door policies. Understanding Madison's
21Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: American
Economic and Cultural Expansionf 1890-1945. (Hill and Wang,
New York, 1982), esp. p. 3-37
arguments for free trade through government restrictions also 
bridges the gap between the doctrines of liberal developmentalism 
and the traditionally high tariff barriers enacted after 1816. 
Rosenberg astutely observed that "liberal protectionists" in the 
late nineteenth century believed "nations...had the right to use 
tariffs to develop their own special endowments, as long as the 
duties did not discriminate in favor of certain trading partners 
and create privileged spheres of influence." While Madison's 
arguments for the Port Bill never reached this level of 
sophistication, the beginnings of "liberal protectionism," or "fair 
trade" are clearly in evidence.
Whether or not the Port Bill would have stimulated Virginia's 
economy and maintained the profitability of tobacco into the next 
century will never be known. While the Port Bill took effect on 
June 10, 1786, the ratification of the Federal Constitution by
Virginia in 1788 superseded the Virginia law's provisions for 
regulating interstate commerce. Even if the enumeration of ports 
continued after 1788, its effects would have been marginal after 
the invention of the cotton gin. Within a decade, cotton surpassed 
tobacco as the major cash crop for the commonwealth, and the 
urgency to maintain profit margins on tobacco diminished. 
Ironically, the most visible effect of the Port Bill between 1786- 
1788 was an increase in tariff revenues, although Madison claimed 
that the bill produced the intended effect of raising the price of 
tobacco from 20/. to 25/. within a few months of its 
implementation. However, none of his other four concerns met with
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any success during the bill's brief life.22 Despite this limited 
legislative success, the debate over the Port Bill in the 1780s 
provided a crucial stage in the development of classical 
liberalism. Madison's argument for competition and equality as the 
key measures of free trade established the ideological origins in 
America for the principle of "fair trade," and contributed to the 
evolution from Republican virtue to Liberal progress.
22James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, (December 4, 1786),
Hutchinson and Rachal, The Papers of James Madison. IX, p. 192
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